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Can UN Have a Civil Service?

by Thomas J. Hamilton

1953

In November 1952 a panel of legal advisers appointed by Secretary General Trygve Lie submitted a report in which, among other things, they defined the factors necessary for the creation and maintenance by the United Nations of a true international civil service. These included, as might have been expected, a sense of responsibility to the United Nations, abstention from active political work, a reasonable security of tenure, and "eligibility for employment without regard to race, class, color or religious, political or social opinions or beliefs." However, the three lawyers (one each from the United States, the United Kingdom and Belgium), insisted also upon "conduct by each [UN] officer of his private life in such a way as to deserve the respect of law-abiding citizens of the country in which he works."

It is, of course, taken for granted that officers of any international organization must be like Caesar's wife in their private as well as their official behavior. Mr. Lie's advisers were not, however, concerned with such general considerations but were dealing specifically with the problem created by the attacks of committees and individual members of

the United States Congress on Communists and allegedly subversive elements among the American members of the Secretariat. The panel's principal recommendations, which were subsequently accepted by Mr. Lie as the basis of his policy toward American employees of the United Nations, called for the dismissal of any employee who refuses to answer questions "involving subversive activities or espionage against the United States," or past or present membership in either the Communist party or in organizations "declared subversive" by the Attorney General. In the case of temporary employees such dismissals offer little difficulty; but present UN staff regulations do not specifically authorize the dismissal on these grounds of employees having permanent or fixed-term contracts, and these may consequently succeed in obtaining heavy severance payments. Some have already started proceedings in the UN Administrative Tribunal.

The entire personnel question will be debated when the General Assembly resumes its 1952 session on February 24. Already there are indications that a number of delegates, notably those of India and the Scandinavian countries, will raise objections to Mr. Lie's

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action in laying down this policy without first consulting the General Assembly, which was in session at the time. Neither the congressional committees nor Mr. Lie have yet attempted any action against non-American members of the Secretariat, but some delegates will nevertheless demand an assurance that, whatever justification there may be for Mr. Lie's decision regarding American employees, it will not be extended to others. Pending the debate in the Assembly, Mr. Lie cannot set a hard and fast policy, and his report on personnel policy, issued on February 5, therefore was only a provisional statement.

Lie's Report

This report showed, however, that at present he is not willing to go as far as the Truman Administration wanted and certainly not as far as the Eisenhower Administration apparently wants him to go. Mr. Lie laid down this standard: No employee would be retained if there was "reasonable ground" for believing he "is engaging or is likely to engage in subversive activities against any member government." He defined "subversive" as meaning activities directed toward the overthrow of a government by force or conspiracy or the incitement or advocacy of such action.

However, President Truman's executive order, issued on January 9, a few days before he left the White House, sets forth a procedure whereby the United States would recommend that Mr. Lie dismiss any employee concerning whom there was

"reasonable doubt." The Eisenhower Administration clearly intends to go beyond this; for Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the United States representative to the United Nations, announced on January 26, the day he presented his credentials to Mr. Lie, that the criterion should be whether an American employee of the UN or a member of the United States delegation was a "bad security risk." Mr. Lodge explained that even if there was no question of a person's loyalty, he might still be such a security risk.

In the meantime, under procedures worked out in January between the United States and the United Nations, all American employees are filing questionnaires containing complete data on their past employment and on the nonpolitical organizations to which they have belonged. These are to be released to the United States Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or both if the employees hold jobs on the professional level, or, in any case, if a preliminary investigation discloses anything "derogatory" against them.

The submission of fingerprints was also required. Although this is standard practice for any applicant for a position with the United States government, it was the first time this had been done in the United Nations. Representatives of *Tass*, the Soviet news agency, zealously observed the long line of Americans waiting to be fingerprinted in the basement of the UN headquarters.

As Mr. Lie pointed out in his report, the United Nations is a poor field for espionage, since the Secre-

tariat handles no military secrets and in fact works "in a glass house, not only physically, but in every respect." It was perhaps for this reason that James F. Byrnes, while Secretary of State, informed the United Nations that the United States would not undertake to sponsor or approve the applications of any Americans for positions on the Secretariat.

This policy was in line with the decision of the United Nations Preparatory Commission in December 1945 that the secretary general should have exclusive responsibility for the appointment of the Secretariat. At that time the Soviet Union lost its attempt to have the Commission fix the policy that appointments should be subject to the consent of the government of which the candidate was a national. As a result the Secretariat includes anti-Tito Yugoslavs, anti-Perón Argentines, anti-Soviet Russians. The United States, as the host country to the United Nations is, of course, in a special position. Nevertheless, if Washington now asserts the right to veto the employment of American nationals of which it disapproves, even if the grounds be espionage or communism, other member nations may demand the same right and the future of a true international Secretariat may be jeopardized.

(Mr. Hamilton has been chief of the United Nations bureau of *The New York Times* since 1946, and has covered United Nations sessions in Paris as well as at Lake Success, Flushing Meadow and New York. Previously he served as correspondent for that newspaper in London, Madrid, Latin America and Washington, and he is author of *Appeasement's Child*, a book on Franco Spain.)

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Are France and U. S. Far Apart?

PARIS — In terms of emotion, relations between the United States and France have seldom been so bad as they are today. In terms of reality, the two countries have seldom been so close.

The emotion comes out in the tart and sometimes heated French comments when the country is metaphorically portrayed as a prostitute (as it recently was in a large circulation American magazine), in French outrage over the "pressure" applied by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in his statement of January 28 that the United States might have to revise its foreign policy if the European allies fail to push forward their unity plans, in American irritation over the instability of French governments, in American bewilderment that the French take at face value all comments of American officials and American publications.

Unity and European Army

But collaboration between nations does not depend on their loving one another. In spite of the impatience which characterizes French and American exchanges, the two countries are approaching European problems generally with the same attitude, especially so far as concerns the point on world affairs which the new Eisenhower Administration has emphasized above everything else—European unity. A few years ago most Europeans who did not think unity undesirable at least considered unrealistic those who believed unity could be realized. But when Mr. Dulles arrived here on January 31 to take the temperature of the French unity movement, he was visiting a country which on the whole seems to

regard unity as a real possibility. The implacable opponents of the idea of unity in any form, Gaullists and Communists, have lost much of their former influence in French politics. France and the United States, however, differ on the form of unity—federation or confederation—and on the speed with which it can be achieved.

The principal source of current exasperation is the creation of the European Defense Community and of the European army. The EDC, a scheme for internationalizing national military affairs and, to some extent, national budgets, originated in France as a counterproposal to the 1950 suggestion of Secretary of State Dean Acheson that Germany be rearmed. The EDC would authorize the arming of Germany in a way which, at least in theory, would prevent Germany from using the arms in adventures of its own. The high point of enthusiasm for the EDC was reached late last spring, when the six nations that would contribute forces to the European army signed the treaty for the defense community. The six are France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Federation or Confederation?

Since then France has not ratified the treaty by parliamentary action. Neither has Germany. The brake on France is the fear that participation in the EDC as the present treaty defines it would lead not so much to the creation of an international community as to the submergence of French national interests to the national interests of Germany, rather than submergence of national inter-

ests to the combined interests of the European community. As a result of this fear, Mr. Dulles found in France a strong desire to revise the EDC in advance of its ratification. The treaty as now written calls for a real federation, with a single army to be made up of blocs of troops, probably of division strength, provided by the member countries. By contrast, French thinking tends toward a kind of confederation, making it possible for national troops to serve a period in the international force and then return to their national forces; and toward vesting control of the international force in some organ representative of the defense ministries of the six countries rather than in one supranational minister.

When René Mayer took office as premier early in January, he resolved to submit the EDC treaty to the National Assembly for ratification. But it seems unlikely that it will be accepted without confederation-like amendments. Advocates of unity who object, however, to the present treaty are troubled by the fact that a large portion of the French Army is involved in Indochina, while a German Army would not be diverted from Europe by any extra-European task.

Whatever predisposition may have existed in France to trust Germany has been dissipated by Britain's exposure on January 15 of a strongly led Nazi group in their zone of occupation, by the American High Commissioner's publication of a report on Nazi resurgence, and by the pitiable revelations during the military trial at Bordeaux of seven German SS men, and twelve Alsatians

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What Will Russia Do Now?

President Eisenhower's announcement in his State of the Union message of February 2 that Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa had been freed for raids against the Communist China mainland, and the visit to Western Europe of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who urged the European nations to create the stalled European army by April at the latest, represent pressures on Russia and China to end the Korean war stalemate.

Will these pressures bring about the desired effect? Or will they have to be followed by more extensive measures—such as American participation in Chiang Kai-shek's proposed operations on the China mainland, the immediate rearming of Japan, a free rein for Germany to recover the territories it lost in the east after World War II, by force if necessary? Are we on the eve of an era of global negotiations leading to stabilization, or on the eve of World War III?

How Strong is Russia?

Answers to these questions hinge on one's estimate of the real strength of the U.S.S.R., which, as the principal industrial nation in the Soviet bloc, serves as the arsenal for Communist China and for the Eastern European satellites. On this point there has been considerable divergence of opinion between the United States and its Western European allies. Here the U.S.S.R. is often depicted as a "monolithic," powerful state, commanding not only decisive land force superiority but also modern weapons such as the atomic bomb and having at its disposal the ideological weapon of Communist

propaganda. The Western European nations, however, on the basis of their intelligence information, have expressed doubts about the internal solidity and the military sticking power, in Europe at least, of the U.S.S.R. and regard American insistence on the need for hasty rearmament and accelerated unification of Western Europe as exaggerated. And former President Truman, since his retirement, has said he was "not convinced" that the Russians have the atomic bomb.

This statement was promptly contradicted by President Eisenhower when he declared, "We have incontrovertible evidence that Soviet Russia possesses atomic weapons." However, according to a distinguished student of atomic problems, William L. Laurence of *The New York Times*, Mr. Truman may be right in the sense that the Russians are still in the early stages of learning how to make a successful, highly efficient bomb—and that "a man in a jalopy is no match against a driver in a de luxe 1953 model."

Meaning of Purges

While Russia is admittedly behind the Western nations in technological development, Western economists believe it has made impressive gains in both industry and agriculture. The current purges, dramatic as they seem to the outside world, are thought to represent, not a far-reaching overturn such as occurred in the 1930's, but the kind of change in a nation's top command which a democracy effects by elections and which a dictatorship, by its very nature, carries out by more drastic means. So far as can be ascer-

tained, these changes have downgraded the secret-police chiefs, notably Lavrenti P. Beria, and military leaders and have placed further power in the hands of Georgi Malenkov, slated to be Stalin's successor. Malenkov, it is reported, is a "Russia firster" who is far less interested in the success of Communist parties abroad than in the security and achievements of Russia as a national state.

Accusations against Jews appear to have made far less of an impression among the Russian people than in the satellite countries, where some Jewish leaders of local Communist parties who in the past had had contacts with other nations proved an easy target for popular discontent with the economic effects of communism and for Communist charges of "cosmopolitanism." The need to deal with Eastern European countries which in some respects are more advanced than the U.S.S.R. has created a problem for the Kremlin such as did not exist during the purges of the 1930's. The powerful growth since 1945 of Russian nationalism, which operates not only against Zionists but also against non-Russian national elements within the U.S.S.R., has gravely undermined the international appeal of communism; and in many countries Communist influence—as distinguished from dissatisfaction with existing non-Communist governments—is on the wane.

The breaking-off of relations with Israel on February 11 appears to confirm the early impression that Moscow is apprehensive about the impact of Zionism on the Jews of Eastern Europe, is determined to weaken the

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Italy's Election Prospects

by Clifford A. L. Rich

Mr. Rich, a student of Italian affairs, formerly research fellow at the University of California, is visiting instructor in political science at the University of Southern California.

Italy's constitution requires that the Chamber of Deputies, which is the lower house of Parliament, be elected every five years and that the election be held within 70 days after the expiration of the legislative term. Since the first election was held on April 18, 1948, the legislative term expires on April 18, 1953, and the election of deputies to the second legislature must take place by June 28.

The first legislature of the Italian republic has been an unprecedented one in many ways, but particularly because the Christian Democratic party of Premier Alcide de Gasperi enjoyed an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies and a large plurality in the Senate. Instead of forming a one-party ministry, the Christian Democrats have governed Italy in close collaboration with the three small Center parties: the Italian Democratic Socialist party, led by Giuseppe Saragat and Giuseppe Romita; the Italian Republican party, headed by Randolpho Pacciardi; and the Italian Liberal party, now headed by Raffaele de Caro. This four-party coalition has enjoyed a majority in the Chamber of Deputies of 366 out of 574 seats, or 63.7 percent; in the Senate its majority has consisted of 193 out of 337 seats, or 57.3 percent.

Economic Improvement

The Christian Democracy and its allies won the 1948 election by promising vast economic reforms and substantial improvements in the standard of living along with the promotion of civil liberties. Their principal opponents—the Communists, led by

Palmiro Togliatti, and the Italian Socialist party, led by Pietro Nenni—campaigns on similar promises. The only difference between the two programs was the choice of means. The Leftists insisted that a planned economy and coercion of private capital were necessary to achieve higher productivity. The Christian Democracy and its allies believed that substantial freedom should be left to private capital. The fact that the United States offer of economic assistance was made contingent upon the victory of the Center coalition was a major factor in swinging the majority toward the Center parties.

Problem of Unemployment

Five years of American economic aid have helped the Italian government to improve its finances and restore the value of the lira. In addition, many Italian industries have been rebuilt and modernized, thereby raising the productive capacity of the country. Much has been done to provide housing to poor families, though not enough. By and large, however, Italy has attained the economic level of pre-World War II.

Although the policies of the de Gasperi government have been substantially progressive, the coalition which has governed Italy has had to grapple with economic problems that defy solution by ordinary methods. Unemployment is listed officially at over 2 million, while studies of this problem reveal that there are 4 million to 5 million job-seekers, the equivalent of one-fourth of the active population. Italy suffers from a

chronic depression as great in intensity as that which rocked the United States in 1933. Neither the Economic Cooperation Administration, the political coalition at the helm in the government, nor private capital have been able to discover means of reducing unemployment. This can only be done by expanding Italian exports and services, by resettling millions of Italians abroad, and by requiring the utilization of all land and capital for productive purposes. So far only the latter method has been possible on a limited scale. Land reform has aimed at expropriating those who fail to utilize their property to the best advantage. Tax reforms to encourage the long-range investment of savings are being enacted.

Leftist Demands

The Left has spent the last five years taking the Center to task for the shortcomings of its economic policies. The Leftist spokesmen insist that trade with Russia and Eastern Europe would create markets for Italian industry and supply Italy with raw materials and food. The capacity of the Soviet sphere to absorb Italian emigrants is not mentioned, since Italians are not attracted to Siberia. Finally, and with some justification, the Left has accused the Administration of weak enforcement of the tax laws and faulty enactment of the land expropriation program. In addition, the Left has charged the government with willful refusal to implement the constitutional reforms.

The Left demands that organized

labor, acting through the General Confederation of Italian Labor, be assured a direct role in economic planning alongside management and government. If labor is to have a political weight commensurate with its economic importance, the Communists and Left Socialists declare that their party leaders in Parliament must be given important portfolios in the cabinet. They stress the fact that the numerical majority of the Christian Democrats, which excludes the laboring classes from representation in the cabinet, does not have a sufficient mandate to govern Italy.

Although few Italians are anxious to lose their political freedom again, many have grown restive and critical of the Administration during the last five years. Some who voted for the Center coalition in 1948 have been won over to the Left. Others have gone over to the Right: to the Italian Monarchist party of Achille Lauro, the rich Neapolitan shipowner, or to the Italian Social Movement, led by former Fascists such as Alberto de Marsanich. The erosion of popular confidence in the Administration has become so marked as a result of the provincial elections of 1951 and 1952 that the Center parties have been forced to amend the election laws in order to insure themselves a parliamentary majority in the coming election.

Electoral Reform

In place of the proportional system, which allotted parliamentary seats on the basis of a fixed quotient for each party and utilized subquotient residues of votes from the constituencies in an additional nation-wide constituency, a system similar to the 1951 French law has been adopted. Any party or coalition of parties that wins over half the popular votes will receive no less than 64 percent of the allotted seats in each constituency.

Should no coalition of parties succeed in gaining a majority, the seats will be distributed proportionally. The difference between any figure over 50 percent of the popular vote and the 64 percent figure representing the allotment of seats has been termed the "majority premium." The figure 64 percent represents the nearest approximation to the present parliamentary representation of the four Center parties, which is actually 63.7 percent.

By this method the Center parties hope to salvage their present ratio of seats in the Chamber of Deputies despite the loss of votes which they expect to suffer. The Left and Right opposition parties hope to transform their momentary popular support into a net parliamentary majority, so that a cabinet crisis might result, necessitating a total reorganization of the parliamentary majority, either by uniting the Center to the Left or to the Right. Each of the extreme groups hopes to force the Center its own way, of course; this has made the Communists and Left Socialists temporary allies, in a sense, with the Monarchists and the Neo-Fascists.

The de Gasperi Administration was forced to sponsor the election reform following the refusal by the Italian Monarchist party to join the Center coalition. Achille Lauro, who has risen from rags to riches in Naples, refused to break his alliance with the Neo-Fascists as a price to enter the Center coalition. As was the case with Mussolini in 1922, Lauro's star seems to be rising to the point where he can refuse a ministerial post in anticipation of the substance of power. If the Center parties fail to win a parliamentary majority, the Right will gain paramount bargaining power, since the bulk of the Center party leans towards conservatism and refuses at all costs to collaborate with the Communists.

The Center parties may well be facing a decisive battle to preserve democracy and stem reaction and the consequent outbreak of civil strife in Italy. For should the parliamentary majority shift to the Right, the country would easily be split into two camps, each directed by the extremists. Since the Right promises to use the power of the state to outlaw all opposition parties and organizations, and the Left threatens to resist by force, Italy might then face civil war.

Decisive Battle

It is in this light that the Center parties justify their decision to amend the election law, since the practical outcome to the defeat of the Center coalition at the polls would be reaction and dictatorship—in both cases the end of democracy. The Center parties make it clear that they are not altering the democratic rule that the majority governs through its elected representatives. They seek only to strengthen the hands of this majority by giving its representatives undisputed control over the legislature and thereby over the Administration. Even a democratic regime must possess authority in order to govern, especially when there are well-organized opposition parties that refuse to tolerate one another!

The logic of the Center cannot be refuted. The question, however, arises, What right has a coalition to govern Italy for another five years on the basis even of a nominal majority when that coalition has steadily lost popular favor since 1948? It is possible that in 1954 or 1955 the aggravation of economic conditions may further draw popular support away from the Center parties. Should the Left and Right parties then clamor for a dissolution of Parliament and a new election, would the cabinet respond affirma-

tively? Legally it could resist the demand. This, however, would weaken the position of the Administration psychologically, thereby impairing the efficiency of the bureaucracy in maintaining peace and order. If the Right and Left resort to direct forms of political action through street brawls and general strikes, would the government re-enact the situation of 1921-22 which ushered in fascism? However the government might choose to act, it would be faced with a severe crisis. If it strikes firmly against the opposition parties, it would be employing the methods of dictatorship. If it acts weakly, it would be swept out of office.

These conjectures are raised merely to illustrate the fact that democracy cannot be preserved permanently by means of tactical stratagems. An election reform, such as the French and Italian Center parties have resorted to as a means to safeguard their parliamentary majority, can strengthen the democratic institutions of those countries only if existing governments, in a new term of office, can achieve positive advances that will allay the distemper of the voters. In Italy this means drastic economic and social reforms which would restore the confidence of the dissatisfied elements in the capacity of the Center parties to fulfill their promises.

Those who clamor for a change in political leadership and form the rank and file of the extremist parties of Left and Right are being driven by psychological frustration and disillusionment resulting from economic insecurity. They generally do not know what lies behind the slogans they are espousing. The Italian voter who votes for the Communists is not aware that one of the effects of a workers' dictatorship would be regimentation to forced labor and a tightly rationed existence for many

years. The Neo-Fascist fails to realize that the restoration of fascism would drag down the standard of living and could once more drive the nation into war and ignominy.

Should the Christian Democracy and its political allies gain a new lease of office through the electoral stratagem of the "majority premium," it will demonstrate that the majority of Italians retain hope in the ability of democratic leaders to resolve the chronic economic crisis. It will also indicate that, bitter as Right and Left criticisms against the regime have been, the critics have not inspired sufficient faith to dispel the fears of many that a change of regime may be a change for the worse instead of for the better.

What U. S. Could Do

A democratic solution of Italy's economic crisis cannot be made without total regimentation of capital and labor unless friendly countries are willing to make a number of sacrifices. First and foremost, as Italian officials explained to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during his visit to Rome on January 31, the barriers to Italian emigration must be removed and an international program to resettle at least 2 million Italian workers and their families must be set in motion. The countries of North and South America and Australasia would have to accept the bulk of this emigration. Then, if Italian industry and agriculture are to absorb the remaining unemployed and the annual increment in active population, it will be necessary to remove trade barriers so that Italy may be permitted to sell its commodities and earn the money necessary to purchase the raw materials and food it needs. It is clear that without the good will of other nations Italy cannot provide gainful employment and a rising standard of

living for its people except at the price of total regimentation.

In the election of April 18, 1948 the United States' offer of economic assistance was a major factor in influencing the Italian voters to support the Center parties. Some new offer to assist Italy to alleviate its distressing unemployment would do much to strengthen the appeal of the Center parties. Once made, however, such an offer would have to be implemented through an international agency adequately equipped to handle a large-scale program of population transfer and resettlement. And immediate steps to dismantle the trade barriers which are stifling economic prosperity would have to be taken through multilateral negotiation by the governments that are interested in preserving democratic institutions in countries such as Italy.

The price of preserving and promoting democracy within friendly countries may seem a high one to pay for Americans and others who take pride in their own independence and prosperity. Yet the price has been justified in the postwar years precisely because it is indispensable that the free nations of the world remain united in defense of democracy.

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Spotlight

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influence of Israel, which it regards as an outpost of the United States in the Middle East, and intends to woo the Arabs.

In the opinion of seasoned observers the current purges signalize the end, not the beginning, of an internal readjustment in the U.S.S.R. which may have the effect of strengthening the country's economy by initiating a drive against corruption, bribery, slackness in production, and so on. According to this analysis, George F. Kennan, former United States Ambassador to Moscow, found it impossible to talk with the Russians during his brief stay there because the Kremlin was then in the throes of the crisis which resulted in the current purges and had no intention of having its difficulties exposed to the West through the reports of so well-informed an observer as Mr. Kennan. If this analysis is accurate, Charles E. Bohlen, reported to be slated as Mr. Kennan's successor, may find the Kremlin more in a mood to consider negotiations—provided such negotiations serve the national interests of Russia.

Assuming that the purpose of the United States and of our allies is ultimately to negotiate "from strength," what could be the diplomatic objec-

tives of the West today? In Europe, will the West welcome the unification of Germany, which would alter the balance of power of the proposed European Community and European army? How will the West reconcile the desire for liberation of Eastern Europe with the rebuilding of German armed strength? If the Russians are to withdraw into their 1939 borders, what will be the future role of American and British troops on the Continent? And in Asia, does the West hope to eject the Chinese Communists from North Korea, and achieve a reunited Korea under non-Communist auspices? Does it expect Chiang to be restored on the China mainland as a result of negotiations? How would the rearmament of Japan affect Russia and China? Or does the West hope to go beyond Russian and Chinese withdrawal and, by the use of nonmilitary pressures, to bring about the overthrow of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung?

The first test of Russia's intentions following the purges will come after the United Nations General Assembly has reconvened in New York on February 24. At that time Andrei Y. Vishinsky is expected to explore once more in the international forum the possibilities of a truce in Korea, and we shall then have an opportunity to see whether the recent moves in the

United States have had the effect of weakening the links between China and Russia.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Paris

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they had pressed into service, for the massacre of 642 French civilians in a church and in the streets of Oradour-sur-Glane, Alsace, during World War II. French suggestions that Britain join the EDC in order to provide a balance for German power have hitherto been rejected by the British.

It is obvious in conversations with Frenchmen that the EDC, designed to bolster the security of the West, appears here as a danger to the security of France. The problem of the United States is to make the most of Europe's interests in unification by assisting Europeans to find the paths that will lead to safety as well as to unity. The supreme question the United States raises in the French mind when it talks of "unity" is how inclusive unity should be. For many people here it is not enough to talk of Western European unity without also talking of the unity of the Atlantic Community, which would include not only Britain but also the United States.

BLAIR BOLLES

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CASE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
10900 EUCLID AVE.
CLEVELAND 6, OHIO

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